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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Heather Heard appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional
guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance.

On appeal, Heard

challenges the denial of her motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Police responded to a hotel room for a report of a domestic disturbance in
Heard's room. (Tr., p.44, L.16 - p.46, L.6.) Heard and Steven Harris had been
observed arguing loudly more than once over the past two days. (Tr. p.9, L.17 p.14, L.5.) Upon arrival, Sergeant Thompson could see inside the room through
the open curtains and open door and observed Heard motionless on a bed and
Harris walking within the room. (Tr., p.46, L.7 - p.47, L.25.)
When the officer attempted to get Heard's attention, she was "semi
responsive [and] extremely groggy." (Tr., p.49, Ls.13-14.) Because the officer
could not ascertain Heard's condition from outside of the hotel room and was
concerned for her safety, he entered the room through the open door. (Tr., p.49,
Ls.9-23.) As Heard finally responded and got up from the bed, a small plastic
bag fell from her lap onto the bed. (Tr., p.50, Ls.9-11.) Once inside the room,
law enforcement also viewed "two syringes soaking in some type of red liquid"
that Harris had moved before they entered. (Tr., p.51, Ls.5-8.)
The state charged Heard with possession of a controlled substance and
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.27-29.) Heard file a motion to suppress
asserting there was "no basis for the officers to enter the room in which [she]
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was staying in and it was done without a warrant."

(R., p.35.)

Following

testimony at a suppression hearing, the court denied Heard's motion finding an
exigency allowing entry into the hotel room without a warrant based on the
"compelling need" of law enforcement to check on Heard. (Tr., p.98, L.19 - p.99,
L.22.) Once law enforcement lawfully entered the room, the syringes observed
in plain view were reasonably seized. (Tr., p.99, L.23 - p.100, L 12.)
Heard entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, preserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress,
and the state dismissed the remaining charge. (Tr., p.105, L.8 - p.112, L.18; R.,
pp.81-93.) The court placed Heard on a four-year period of probation with an
underlying suspended sentence of two-years fixed followed by three-years
indeterminate.

(Tr., p.143, Ls.6-13; R., pp.107-115.)

(R., pp.122-124.)
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Heard timely appealed.

ISSUE
Heard states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Heard's Motion to
Suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Heard failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Heard Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Heard challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, contending the

district court erred in concluding that the entry into her hotel room was justified
by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. (Appellant's brief, pp.410.)

Heard's argument fails.

A review of the record and the applicable law

supports the district court's determination that the entry was constitutionally
reasonable

under the

exigent circumstances

exception

to the

warrant

requirement.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
The Warrantless Entry At Issue Was Justified By A Recognized Exception
To The Warrant Requirement
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article

I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures.

"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls

within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."
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State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)); accord State v. RoiasTapia, 151 Idaho 479, 481, 259 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2011).

"When a

defendant has demonstrated that a warrantless search or seizure occurred, it
becomes the State's burden to prove through presentation of evidence that an
exception to the warrant requirement applied." State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554,
558, 21 P.3d 491, 495 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis omitted) (citing Coolidge, 403
at 455; State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218-19, 984 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1999);
Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 481, 988 P.2d at 707); accord Roias-Tapia, 151 Idaho at
481, 259 P.3d at 627. Contrary to Heard's assertions on appeal, a review of the
record and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that the
state met its burden of proving the existence of a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement with respect to the warrantless entry in this case.
It is well settled that entries necessitated by "exigent circumstances" do
not offend the warrant requirement. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S 499, 509 (1978);
State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993); State v. Sailas, 129
Idaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 1996). In determining whether
exigent circumstances are present, the inquiry is "whether the facts reveal 'a
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant."' State v.
Wren, 115 Idaho 618,624,768 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Tyler,
436 U.S. at 509). "The test for application of this warrant exception is whether
the facts as known to the [officer] at the time of the entry, together with
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reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief that an exigency
justified the intrusion." State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 136 P.3d 379 (Ct. App.
2006) (citing State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217 (Ct. App.
2003)); accord State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374-75, 209 P.3d 668, 671-72
(Ct. App. 2009); State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 470, 197 P.3d 327, 331 (Ct.
App. 2008).

"A law enforcement officer's reasonable belief of danger to the

police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling is one type of exigency
that may justify a warrantless entry." Araiza, 147 Idaho at 375, 209 P.3d at 672
(citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 470,
197 P.3d at 331 ).
Following a hearing on the motion the court concluded "clearly there was
reason to call for the police hearing [the dispute between Heard and Harris],
particularly with what [the security guard] had heard and seen earlier that night."
(Tr., p.97, Ls.17-19.)

In concluding that the officer's entry into Heard's hotel

room was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement, the district court found the window was "open or unshaded" (Tr.,
p.97, L.22) and the door was open (Tr., p.97, L.24). This allowed the officers to
make the following observations:
So what they knew was there was an argument very shortly before
and now it's completely quiet, and in fact you have an unresponsive
person laying on the bed. The testimony was a little bit different,
one said face down, one said on the side, but you have a
completely nonresponsive person shortly after long arguing. And
there's been some question that there was no report of physical
violence, but at that point the officers had every reason to be
concerned about physical violence because of a nonresponsive
person very shortly after an argument. So she wouldn't wake up
very quickly and there was testimony about not knowing what her
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condition was. And it could have been different things, head injury,
intoxication, perhaps some other kind of injury that wasn't
discussed, but they didn't know.
(Tr., p.98, Ls.4-18.) There was "a compelling need to enter that room to check
on Ms. Heard." (Tr., p.99, Ls.1-2.)

The court subsequently concluded, upon

these facts, that "the officers had every right to enter." (Tr., p.100, L.15.) The
record supports the district court's conclusions.
Before entering the hotel room, law enforcement had received a report of
a domestic dispute from the hotel security guard who reported "there might be
some domestic abuse because there was a lot of yelling [and] verbal
confrontation." (Tr., p.46, Ls.4-6.) The reporting party had personally witnessed
Heard and Harris arguing loudly outside of the front of the hotel (Tr., p.9, L.19 p.10, L.10), received a report of them arguing outside a gas station (Tr., p.33,
Ls.10-16), and heard them "getting boisterous in their room again" (Tr., p.12,
Ls.14-15) immediately before calling law enforcement.
When officers arrived at the hotel, they observed Heard and Harris
through an unobscured window and an open door. (Tr., p.46, L.15 - p.47, L.25.)
Heard was lying face down on one of the two beds in the room and was not
moving.

(Tr., p.47, Ls.21-23.)

The officer announced his presence and

indicated he wanted to speak to the two of them. (Tr., p.47, Ls.16-25.) When
Heard remained motionless, the officer asked the male to wake her up. (Tr.,
p.49, Ls.3-12.) When that was unsuccessful, the officer entered the open door
into the room to make contact with Heard. (Tr., p.49, Ls.17-21.) Heard was very
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slow to get up and the officer was not able to determine if she was "groggy, just
waking up, or intoxicated, [or portraying] odd behavior." (Tr., p.50, Ls.2-4.)
Viewed in their totality, the above facts amply support the district court's
conclusion that the entry of the hotel room was justified by the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

Given the report of a

possible domestic disturbance, the fact that the couple in question had been
seen twice arguing earlier in the evening and heard arguing loudly before the call
to police, the fact that Heard was motionless in a bed and unresponsive to a
police presence mere feet away, the fact that officers could not ascertain Heard's
condition from outside the room, and the fact that the potential domestic suspect
was walking freely about the hotel room, the police acted objectively reasonably
in entering the room without a warrant to ensure the safety and well-being of
Heard.
Heard challenges the district court's conclusion that the entry was
justified, contending the state failed to prove the existence of an exigency.
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)

On appeal, Heard concedes that, if she "had not woken

up at all," police "may have had cause to enter the room to see if she was
unconscious and needed medical assistance." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) That is
the situation the court found existed in finding an exigency and denying Heard's
motion to suppress:

"[S]he wouldn't wake up very quickly and there was

testimony about not knowing what her condition was." (Tr., p.98, Ls.14-15.)
Although Heard argues she was awake and in the process of getting up
when the officer entered the hotel room (Appellant's brief, p.9 (citing Tr., p.55,
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L.23 - p.56, L.6, p.60, L.22 - p.61, L.2)), that claim is inconsistent with the
evidence presented:
Q: [counsel for co-defendant Harris]:
[Harris]?

So you were talking to

A: [Sgt. Thompson]: Yes, sir.
Q:
He tried to wake [Heard] up and she actually responded,
didn't she?

A:

Not really, sir. Some slight movement and some mumbling.

Q:
And so there was movement, wasn't there, and some
mumbling?

A:

Maybe some slight moving, sir.

Q:
But you didn't want to wait for him to get her up so you went
in at that time?

A:
No, sir. That's not the case of whether or not we're waiting
to get her up. When he said, Hey, the cops are here, you need to
get up, and she doesn't move hardly at all, if any, that's a pretty
clear sign there might be something wrong. As I stated earlier
before, usually when the police arrive and they start questioning
people, everybody in the dwelling gets up off their feet. I mean,
that's the point where we have to control people, tell them to sit
down and stay put and stuff like that. I thought it was odd behavior.
That's just my opinion.
Q:
Because you thought that it was odd behavior, that's why
you went into the room?

A:
No, sir. I was genuinely concerned for her well being. I was
called in for a domestic dispute, these guys have been having
problems for two days, she's unresponsive, I have no idea whether
she's unconscious or if she's been drugged or she's intoxicated,
possible head injury. I don't know the circumstance of her well
being so that's my general concern.
(Tr., p.55, L.23 - p.57, L.2.)
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Given the nature of the report and the suspicious circumstances attendant
thereto, it was entirely reasonable for the officer to believe Heard was in need of
assistance. Heard has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that
the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
district court's order denying Heard's motion to suppress.
DATED this 2th day of Janua
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